OPEC Oil Busters--When You Finally Take the War Seriously and Stop Financing The War Against Ourselves

Robert Zubin, Rocky Mountain News

Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez recently joined Iranian president Mahmoud Amadinejad in threatening to raise oil prices to $200 per barrel. The threat should be taken quite seriously. With no practical transportation fuel alternative to petroleum available to the world market, the OPEC oil cartel has already been successful in raising prices an order of magnitude since 1999, with a 50 percent increase effected in 2007 alone.

Much of the money we are spending on oil is being used to fund an international network of front organizations and madrassas devoted to spreading terrorist ideology. Meanwhile, Iran is using its share of the take to fund the development of materials that can be used in nuclear weapons.

We are financing a war against ourselves, and the way things are going, we will soon be paying the enemy more than we are paying our own military.

In light of this, a top priority of U.S. national security policy should be to break the oil cartel. This imperative has been apparent since the 1973 oil embargo, but nothing effective has been done.

However there is now a way to break OPEC.

What is needed is for the Congress to pass a law requiring that all new cars sold in the United States be flex-fueled - able to run on any combination of alcohol or gasoline fuel. Such cars are existing technology - in fact about 24 different models of flex-fuel cars were produced by the Detroit Big Three in 2007, and they only cost about $100 more than the same car in a gasoline-only version. But, since alcohol fuel pumps (such as E85, a fuel mix that is 85 percent ethanol, 15 percent gasoline) are nearly as rare as unicorns, flex-fuel cars only command about 3 percent of the new-car market.

The reason E85 pumps are so rare is that gas station owners don't want to dedicate one of their pumps to a kind of fuel that only a few percent of the cars can use. If we had a flex-fuel requirement, however, then within three years of enactment there would be 50 million cars on the road capable of running on high-alcohol fuels. Under those conditions, E85 and M50 (a 50 percent methanol, 50 percent gasoline fuel mix; flex-fuel cars can use any alcohol, including methanol) pumps would start appearing everywhere.

But most important, this would not just be happening here. By requiring that all new cars sold in the United States be flex-fueled, we would be forcing all the foreign car manufacturers to switch their lines to flex-fuel as well, effectively making flex-fuel the international standard. So there would be hundreds of millions of cars worldwide capable of running on alcohol, forcing gasoline to compete everywhere against alcohol fuels that can be produced from numerous sources. This would effectively break the vertical monopoly that the oil cartel currently holds on the world's fuel supply and keep prices in the $50-a-barrel range, because that is where alcohol fuels become competitive.

It would also create a market that would mobilize tens of billions of dollars of private investment into areas such as cellulosic ethanol and other advanced alcohol production techniques that can cheapen alcohols further and radically expand their potential resource base (although methanol already can be produced from any kind of biomass, without exception, as well as from coal, natural gas and urban trash).

With such a production and distribution infrastructure in place, we could proceed to not merely contain the petrotyrants, but wipe them out at our discretion by implementing tax and tariff policies that favor alcohol over petroleum.

We could effectively take more than a trillion dollars a year that is now going to the oil cartel, and direct it toward the world agricultural sector instead. This would not only be of great benefit to farmers here, but an enormous boon to the Third World, which otherwise faces brutal looting through continued unconstrained OPEC price hikes.

Instead of financing terrorism, we could be funding world development. Instead of selling blocks of CNN to Saudi princes, we could be selling tractors to Africa. That is the way to win the war on terror.

Robert Zubrin is president of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace engineering research and development firm, and author of Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of Oil.

DOD scrubbers Scurrying To Scrub All Internet of References to Mr. Islam

Sonia Henies tutu...Claudia Rosett has found some very interesting giant holes in the story of Mr. Islam and how he came to America and now, boys and girls, the Pentagon Scrubbers are hard at work getting rid of all the references to Mr. Islam who recently called Mr. Couglin a "Christian Zealot" and before you could say presto changeo Mr. Couglin was fired. The Rosett Report has the story line up to date here and needless to say it's a Wowser! One of the missing files unscrubbed by Rosett " "As of this writing a cached version can still be found on Google. Lest it disappear from the face of the earth, here’s a copy of the original in pdf format, and here it is saved as a web page. This is an Armed Forces Press Service article which the Pentagon until recently appeared only too happy to publicize as DoD gospel. What’s going on? I phoned the Pentagon to ask, following more than a week of trying to get answers prior to publishing the story last Friday about the mysteries surrounding this top aide, whom Gordon England, number two man at the Pentagon, described last year (that link has not yet disappeared) as his “personal close confidante.” No answers yet. Once again: Who’s running this show?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Senior Advisor to Deputy Secretary Focuses on Relationship Building By Donna Miles American Forces Press Service WASHINGTON, Oct. 15, 2007 – If Hesham Islam’s life story was translated into a screenplay -- and it’s got all the makings of a Hollywood blockbuster -- the director would be hard-pressed to come up with a more compelling chain of events landing him as a top advisor to the deputy defense secretary. Hesham Islam, special assistant for international affairs to Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, spends a rare moment in his Pentagon office. Islam spends most of his time out of the office, building relationships. Photo by Donna Miles (Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available. The movie would open with Islam as a young boy growing up in Cairo, Egypt, huddling in terror as Israeli bombs came raining down, demolishing much of the building around him and his family. Next would be the scene of the teenager who moves to Iraq when his Egyptian naval officer father is transferred to help establish the Arabian Gulf naval academy Islam would later attend. The camera would then close in on a young merchant mariner adrift for three days in the Arabian Sea after an Iranian torpedo sunk his 16,000-ton cargo ship, drowning all but Islam and four of his crewmates. Next viewers would see the young man, who after corresponding with an American pen-pal for more than three years, dares ask for the photograph that leaves him smitten with his future wife. The action would shift to the United States, where the new husband, desperate to provide for his family, enlists in the Navy. Later he will be accepted into Officer Candidate School, then ultimately retire 20 years later as a Navy commander. Today, Islam is drawing on those vast experiences to advise Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England on international affairs. Although Islam’s life lends itself to high-drama scenes typically seen on the big screen, England sees him more as a behind-the-scenes player with a special talent for bringing other actors together. Before retiring from the Navy, Islam contributed this skill and his regional and language expertise on the staff of then-Navy Secretary England. Much of Islam’s work focused on U.S. military engagement with the Middle East. As England moved to the No. 2 Pentagon position, Islam followed, broadening his purview to “the whole globe.” “He’s my interlocutor,” England said. “He represents me to the international community. He assists me in my own outreach efforts, and he’s extraordinarily good at it.” Islam is rarely at his Pentagon desk, believing the best way to serve as England’s “man out in town in Washington, D.C.” is to be out and about, building relationships. “I am a strong believer that there are no relationships between countries,” he said. “Relationships are between people, and those relationships are what bring countries together.” “It is all about friendships between people,” agreed England, “and you build them one person at a time.” England calls relationship building “a contact sport.” “You can’t develop friendships unless you actually go out and take the effort to meet people and interact with people,” he said. As he represents the Defense Department around the country and the around the world, England said, he counts on Islam’s insights and advice. “Hesham helps me understand people’s different perspectives and how they see things,” England said. “He has a cultural background that’s very helpful, but he also works at it very hard to get a better understanding of people and how they think.” Islam works tirelessly to befriend diplomats from around the world, learning from each about their country, its sensitivities, and its requirements. “I help them understand us, as Americans, and help my boss understand them,” he said. “My goal is to bridge the gap and help people understand each other, even if we are different.” Not all Islam’s efforts are directed toward other countries. A Muslim, Islam works closely with the Muslim-American community, encouraging its members to integrate into American society and take an active stand with the United States in the war on violent extremism. “This war can’t be won by just Americans,” he said. “It’s a war that has to be fought by Muslims. Islam has been hijacked, and it is time to take it back.” Islam said he’s proud of the 5,000 Muslims actively supporting that effort in the U.S. military. Among them is his own son, Navy Lt. j.g. Rami Islam, who serves aboard the carrier USS Carl Vinson. “As a parent, I’m very proud that my son is serving this country,” he said. After growing up in wartime, first in Egypt, then in Iraq, Islam hopes this dialogue can help eliminate differences that can lead to misunderstanding and conflict. “If people talk, people don’t fight. If they talk, they don’t argue,” he said. “I try to bring talking and understanding into the dialogue.” “Hesham has wonderful friendships and relationships, and therefore he can give me extraordinarily good advice in dealing with countries and people,” England said. “I take his advice, and I listen to him all the time.” England said he rarely disagrees with Islam’s guidance. “After all,” he said, “if you have a good doctor, you listen to your doctor, right?”

Biographies: Gordon England

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England (left) counts on the counsel of Hesham Islam (far right), his special assistant for international affairs, when representing the United States abroad. Here, Islam joins England during a visit to Iraq in July 2007. Courtesy photo Download screen-resolution Download high-resolution Now-retired Navy Cmdr. Hesham Islam (right), special assistant for international affairs to Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, poses before his retirement with his son, now Lt. j.g. Rami Islam. Five generations of the Islam family have served as naval officers. Courtesy photo Download screen-resolution Download high-resolution

It's The Orcs! Stupid! Furgitbutit, says USAF -- "Fly-Fight-Win" The Budget Battle!

The U.S. Air Force wants airmen on hot red alert "Fly-Fight-Win" for the BUDGET BATTLE!! You heard right. Despite the agony of fighting a war in two countries, sabotage by Congress and a host of other sordid details---the Air Force wants to make sure that Air men know that when it comes to taxpayer's money all is fair in love and war. Don't worry about the Orcs. Just make sure the Marines are screwed. The Navy doesn't get those money guzzling ships. So prepare to make the Air Force -- King of the Pork Pigs. After all--the Budget Battle is a Zero Sum Gain.{ZSG.. relating to a Budget Battle in which a gain for the Air Force is offset by an equal loss for the Marines : . .under the zero-sum budgeting system that governs federal spending, the money for U.S. Air Force will be deducted from the Navy or the Marines.}

Did Van Riper win?

Defense and the National Interest continues the Lessons Learned from Millennium Challenge 2002 war games. What was the end result? Were the books cooked to satisfy the CG egos? Were the war games a flimsy put up job to buttress the military-industrial-complex to justify the expense of gazillions taxpayer dollars: Test or Validate? Explore the rarefied air that permeates the rooms of war games and generals here'
here, and here.

Sleeping With the Dinosaurs and Impediments to Innovation

The recent game of chicken, initiated by Iran launching speed boats against U.S. Navy ships in the Strait of Hormuz, is replaying an old tune written by Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper.

In Millennium Challenge 2002, DOD wrote out a check for a $250 million war game to test the new "data-linked U.S. forces" aka network-centric warfare— Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, was the CG of the bad guys aka the non-data linked troops. In the first days of the game battle, the Riper smoked the good guys and the "superior" tech got a new bunghole using off the shelf "unconventional" methods that sank 16 good guy ships.

In any other field, these results would have the pause to consider the implications for the future. In our military, these results only get in the ways of facts aka the good guys-U.S. must, by definition--Win.

So what happened? Why did tech lose? Why did robust creative,unappreciated, thinking win?

Critiquing a war game NOVA INTERVIEW pbs

NOVA: The U.S. military has learned some of its techniques in war games like Millennium Challenge 2002. What is the overall purpose of a war game?

Van Riper: War games are to learn a number of different things. Depending how they're designed, you could learn about a particular piece of equipment. You could learn about a new type of doctrine, the style that you want to incorporate some tactic or technique or procedure. Or you could have a new operating concept, a brand new idea of how you wanted to fight in the future. So war games can be for experimenting with new ideas, or they can be practicing current ideas to become more proficient or to gain greater insight into those ideas.

NOVA: What was your experience with Millennium Challenge?

Van Riper: I had a great deal of concern about the ideas that they were experimenting with in this particular exercise. I say that because I didn't think the ideas were intellectually worthy of being tested for that sort of money. Unfortunately, from where I sat, and I think I had a pretty good view, these ideas were never truly tested. Yet the conclusion drawn at the end of the exercise was that they had been and that they were worthy of adoption by our operating forces. I think they're very shallow. They are fundamentally flawed. They have no true intellectual content. And yet they're being, in my view, foisted on our operational commanders.

I believe there were lessons that could have been learned from Millennium Challenge and applied in Iraq that weren't. Some of them were lessons that in the actual fighting might not have been lessons we needed; we learned them but didn't need to use them. Others we could have used, particularly, for example, in what would be called the low-intensity phase. That's the phase of insurgency that we found ourselves in after the supposed end of major combat operations. There were some things we saw but not in finite detail in Millennium Challenge that might have helped if we'd have thought a little bit more about them before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

NOVA: Was the game rigged?

Van Riper: There were accusations that Millennium Challenge was rigged. I can tell you it was not. It started out as a free-play exercise, in which both Red and Blue had the opportunity to win the game. However, about the third or fourth day, when the concepts that the command was testing failed to live up to their expectations, the command then began to script the exercise in order to prove these concepts.

This was my critical complaint. You might say, "Well, why didn't these concepts live up to the expectations?" I think they were fundamentally flawed in that they leaned heavily on technology. They leaned heavily on systems analysis of decision-making.

NOVA: So do you think Millennium Challenge 2002 was a waste?

Van Riper: I'm angered that, in a sense, $250 million was wasted. But I'm even more angry that an idea that has never been truly validated, that never really went through the crucible of a real experiment, is being exported to our operational forces to use.

What I saw in this particular exercise and the results from it were very similar to what I saw as a young second lieutenant back in the 1960s, when we were taught the systems engineering techniques that Mr. [Robert] McNamara [Secretary of Defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson] had implemented in the American military. We took those systems, which had good if not great utility in the acquisition of weapon systems, to the battlefield, where they were totally inappropriate. The computers in Saigon said we were winning the war, while out there in the rice paddies we knew damn well we weren't winning the war. That's where we went astray, and I see these new concepts potentially being equally as ill-informed and equally dangerous.

NOVA: Part of your victory in Millennium Challenge was based on your knowledge that the U.S. had a preemptive doctrine. How did you take advantage of that?

Van Riper: My belief at the outset of Millennium Challenge was that Blue believed it had a monopoly on preemption, and it would strike first. And, of course, in any war game I was familiar with up to that point, that had never been the case. The U.S. had only gone to war as a result of some aggression by an enemy, and so always had to react. Now that it was announced policy that we reserved the right to do that, the Blue force was going to take full advantage of it and plan to strike first.

“If it was going to be a fight, I was going to get in the first blow.”

So I simply stepped back and said, "What advantage is there for Red to wait for Blue to strike?" There was none. And that lead to the natural conclusion that if they're coming, and we can't persuade them not to diplomatically, then we will strike.

As I looked at an ultimatum that gave me less than 24 hours to respond to what literally was a surrender document, it was clear to me that there was no advantage in any of this diplomacy. I was very surprised that the Joint Forces Command personnel who had argued for using all of the elements of national power—the economic, the diplomatic, the political information—in some sort of coherent fashion, really came at Red with a blunt military instrument. So it was clear to me that this was not going to be negotiated, this was going to be a fight. And if it was going to be a fight, I was going to get in the first blow.

No surrender

NOVA: How could the military have planned for Operation Iraqi Freedom differently?

Van Riper: I have not been surprised by the things that have occurred since late spring, early summer in Iraq. It's not because I have any unique insights or had a premonition or understood it better. But I think I'm an astute student of history, and if you look at history and understand how people resist, how wars play out, this is not an unusual occurrence.

If you have a war that doesn't come to a very definitive conclusion, there are people who don't believe they've been defeated. One thing that we saw in this war, there was no surrender. There was no point in time where someone in authority said, "The government of Iraq surrenders to the Coalition forces."

NOVA: There is the famous question of "boots on the ground"—the size of the force that captured Baghdad. Was the small force size a vindication of transformational concepts?

Van Riper: There were sufficient forces to capture Baghdad. But what we call follow-up forces—exploitation forces and reserves—were not available. Imagine on the day that we seized Baghdad, if we had follow-up armed forces, exploitation forces, continue up into what we now know as the Sunni Triangle, go into Tikrit, instead of having that long lag time. If there had been a lot of so-called boots on the ground at the beginning, you might have convinced a lot of people that the war was over at that time. If you'd have thought about how you surrounded Baghdad, perhaps you could have caught some of these officials and had somebody who could surrender to you. Other than the actual attack on Baghdad, it was not very well thought through.

The Cutting Edge and Sleeping with the Dinosaurs

Easy Speeder By annihilist
.
The cutting edge OWK as innovations is, at times, elusive yet not so arcane that you could not afford to have a point man in front of the van to make sure you were staying current.
For EMI some teens provided that vital function:

IN 2006 EMI, the world's fourth-biggest recorded-music company, invited some teenagers into its headquarters in London to talk to its top managers about their listening habits. At the end of the session the EMI bosses thanked them for their comments and told them to help themselves to a big pile of CDs sitting on a table. But none of the teens took any of the CDs, even though they were free. “That was the moment we realised the game was completely up,” says a person who was there.

For the military, LtGen Paul Van Riper provided the identical function and he had to resign to make damn sure he message was received during the Millennium Challenge War Games in 2002
War games rigged? Army News

The most elaborate war game the U.S. military has ever held was rigged so that it appeared to validate the modern, joint-service war-fighting concepts it was supposed to be testing, according to the retired Marine lieutenant general who commanded the game’s Opposing Force.

That general, Paul Van Riper, said he worries the United States will send troops into combat using doctrine and weapons systems based on false conclusions from the recently concluded Millennium Challenge 02. He was so frustrated with the rigged exercise that he said he quit midway through the game.

He said that rather than test forces against an unpredictable enemy, the exercise “was almost entirely scripted to ensure a [U.S. military] ‘win.’ ”

His complaints prompted an impassioned defense of the war game from Vice Adm. Marty Mayer, the deputy commander of Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Va. The command, which sponsored and ran the war game, is the four-star headquarters charged with developing the military’s joint concepts and requirements.

Watch Your Six...

Wretchard Says

Al-Qaeda is mining Facebook to unearth personal details of coalition military personnel. "The MI5 analysts have seen that many thousands of servicemen and women had posted personal details on those websites and had included news of their careers, pictures of themselves in uniforms and details of past postings. “Those details in the hands of al-Qaida operatives offer invaluable information,” Evans warns." Fr:Belmont Club.

Former Michigan Congressman Mark Siljander (REP) indicted for al Qaida/Taliban fund raising

Debbie Schlussel's old boss, former U.S. Congressman Mark Siljander was indicted by a federal grand jury on counts of counts of money laundering, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. The former delegate to the United Nationns is accused of belonging to a terrorist fundraising ring that sent more than $130,000 to an al-Qaida and Taliban supporters.

"The public is cautioned that the charges contained in this indictment are simply accusations, and not evidence of guilt. Evidence supporting the charges must be presented to a federal trial jury, whose duty is to determine guilt or innocence. The defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty."DOJ

For Sale EBAY:Yon's Dragon Skin Body Armor--Asking $1.00--Cost $4,000.00--Not For Combat Use

Michael's not saying its a POS and that's why he wants to unload it on EBAY for one dollar. He does say Dragon Skin is inferior, heavier, over priced and not for use in combat conditions.

" This is what I think of Dragon Skin. I don't want to see American soldiers wearing this body armor. It's inferior to and heavier than alternatives. I spent about $4,000 for mine and just put it on Ebay starting bid: $1. I'll be happy to get $2 back from it. When I go back to Iraq in a couple weeks, I will not be wearing Dragon Skin. The controversy over body armor is largely manufactured and is impeding the fielding of better body armor. "

"Dragon Skin for sale: I paid approximately $4,000 for this body armor but would not recommend it to any buyer who plans to use it in combat. I do not like Dragon Skin for various reasons. The Dragon Skin is too heavy and also relatively difficult to wear. If you fall in the water with this body armor, I think you will drown before you can shed the Dragon Skin, or if you are trapped in tangled wreckage after an IED, you will have an extremely difficult time shedding the Dragon Skin. There is no quick release and it’s plain hard to get in and out of. I talked with a Special Forces soldier some months ago about body armor. His humvee was hit with an EFP and was burning. He said that if not for the quick release on his armor, he said he would have burned up."

"Again, please do not buy this for combat. There are cheaper body armors that are better. I’m starting the bid at $1 and will use the proceeds to return to Iraq at the end of January."

Countering Ideological Support To Terrorism:Michael Doran

FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
DR. MICHAEL DORAN
TOPIC: COUNTERING TERRORIST IDEOLOGY ((PDF).
THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2007, 1:30 P.M. EST

MODERATOR: Hello and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. Please turn off your cell phones or anything else that makes noise. Today, we have for you Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mike Doran, who is in charge of the Support for Public Diplomacy office. He is going to talk today about countering ideological support to terrorism. Here is Mr. Doran.

DR. DORAN: Thank you very much, Andy. I'd like to thank the Foreign Press Center and all of you for coming today. It's a great pleasure. We've seen, in the last few months, a dramatic improvement in the situation in Iraq.
I have before me here just a few statistics that I'm sure you're all aware of. Violence is at the lowest level since January of 2006. Attack levels are continuing at the downward trend that began in June. The number of weekly attacks recently reached its lowest level since early February 2006. The number of IED attacks each week is down more than 60 percent in the four months -- in the last four months, reaching the lowest level since January of 2006. Since the surge of U.S. forces began earlier this year, civilian deaths across Iraq are down by about 60 percent and they're down 75 percent in Baghdad. Recently, we had the lowest number of single-day attacks across the nation in three and a half years.
Now this clearly marks, I think, success against al-Qaida. It's important not to overstate that because al-Qaida remains a very potent and dangerous enemy. So we're nowhere near the point where we can declare a victory against al-Qaida. We're not even near the point where we can say that we have -- that we've fully stabilized Iraq. We clearly have a long and difficult path ahead of us, but I think that this change, this significant change in the levels of violence is worth noting. And it's worth taking a pause and asking ourselves how -- why, since the surge, have we had such a significant success against al-Qaida.
I want to discuss it a little bit and I want to put the focus, actually, on al-Qaida itself. Because I think when you look at it closely, you see that the major reason for the successes against al-Qaida are to be found in the nature of al-Qaida's ideology itself. The ideology contains the seeds of its own destruction and I think that's true for four major reasons.
The first is that al-Qaida's global ideology makes it very unresponsive to the local needs of the population in Iraq and anywhere else where we find people adhering to the ideology. The second reason is that it advocates the killing of fellow Sunni Muslims. And the third reason is that it advocates the killing of innocent civilians of all kinds. And the fourth reason is that the teachings of al-Qaida that justify the indiscriminate killing of innocents flies in the face of about a thousand years of traditional Islamic teaching.

And all those factors together, in the right circumstances, I think, undo al-Qaida. We can see that if you look at the history of what's happened in Iraq over the last year. In October of last year, al-Qaida in Iraq announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq. And it's really at that point that you can start seeing the seeds of the destruction of the movement taking root. Because the minute they did that, the minute al-Qaida established this -- basically, the rudiments of a territorial state, there was a counter reaction among the population. The local population was forced to ask themselves, do we really want to live under a Taliban-style regime like that of al-Qaida? And they began to realize that al-Qaida takes its ideology very seriously.

Now al-Qaida -- why did they announce this territorial state, the Islamic State of Iraq? Because they wanted to counter the claim coming from Iraqis themselves that al-Qaida is a foreign movement that doesn't represent Iraqis and Iraqi needs. So when al-Qaida established the Islamic State of Iraq, they put out into the forefront this fictional character, Abu Omar Baghdadi, who is not really the head of the Islamic State of Iraq. He's a fictional character with the name Al-Baghdadi to say that he is a son of Iraq. In actual fact, it's Abu Ayyub al-Masri that's the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq.

The local population doesn't think that -- thinks that this is a foreign movement being carried out to -- being carried out to serve the interests of the foreign movement and not responsive to the local population. Now the problem was that they didn't have -- the Iraqis didn't have the power -- the Iraqis didn't have the power to resist the intimidation of al-Qaida or didn't have enough power. And it's the combination of the movement against -- the local movement against al-Qaida combined with the surge which has given the security and the capability to the local opponents of al-Qaida to come to the forefront so that we can see the kind of dramatic change that I opened up with.

Now the key to the surge is that it provided security, because one of the most -- one of the policies of al-Qaida that most alienates the local population is the targeting of Sunni Muslims. And we've seen that since the surge began, they are now listing opponents -- Sunni Muslim opponents of al-Qaida and attacking them and killing them.
And this puts al-Qaida in a very difficult position because ideally, they would like ideologically to represent themselves as the representatives of the Iraqis, as well as the representatives of the Islamic tradition, the true representatives of the Islamic tradition. And when they're put in a position of listing Sunni Muslim targets and actually carrying out assassinations against them, it's an ideological bind for them. We have succeeded, I think, in the last eight to ten months of putting them in a very difficult position where they can't get out of this bind; as long as they are targeting Sunni Muslims, they can't represent themselves as the true -- they can't convincingly represent themselves as the true representatives of Islam.


Now there's a second aspect to this targeting of civilians and that's that it alienates Muslim public opinion. We saw that clearly in July of 2005. There was this exchange, you remember, between Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Zarqawi where Zarqawi was attempting -- was carrying out a policy designed to create a sectarian war in Iraq. And Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote him a letter and said, listen, the average person -- the average Muslim on the street doesn't understand this indiscriminate killing that you're carrying out and you're actually having the effect of alienating people. And we can see from the polls like the Pew Trust, the Global Opinion poll that in fact, the majority of Muslims throughout the Islamic world reject al-Qaida's ideology. So Ayman al-Zawahiri, I think, had his finger on the pulse there and was very right to admonish Zarqawi.

Now they also have an additional problem, al-Qaida, in that their teachings which justify this indiscriminate killing don't accord with the -- with traditional Islam. I think it's worth noting in that regard that in the last month, Dr. Fadl, this former ideologue of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement, has published a book in which he has renounced the Takfiri ideology of al-Qaida. It's extremely significant because Dr. Fadl was one of the primary ideologues of the al-Qaida movement and was a mentor to Ayman al-Zawahiri himself.

So what Dr. Fadl has done in that book is he has enunciated the traditional Islamic prohibition against the kind of indiscriminate killing carried out by individuals or groups that al-Qaida undertakes. He's put himself squarely in the mainstream of the Islamic tradition and has put al-Qaida in a very difficult position, and you can see that from the fact that Ayman al-Zawahiri himself has come out -- has come out, without naming -- without naming Dr. Fadl explicitly, has come out against the position -- the position that he's taking.

So all in all, all in all, al-Qaida is in a very difficult situation, I think, now in Iraq. Obviously, that doesn't mean that they are going to -- that they're not still dangerous. The bombings that we saw in Iraq that you're reading about in Iraq today show us that Iraq remains a very dangerous and difficult place. And it shows us that the road of stabilizing Iraq is going to be a long one.

But it also teaches us, I think, a few lessons about how we can properly combat ideological support for terrorism. And the main point here is that this struggle against al-Qaida is going to be won locally, on the local level. It's important for us to focus on and understand the local conditions that make people think, even for a brief moment, that this ideology may somehow speak to their local conditions. I think when people -- as we saw in Afghanistan, all the polls in Afghanistan show and as we see now in Iraq, when people are really put face to face with a choice of this ideology and what it really means and the alternative, if given the capability to counter it, they will choose the alternative, to counter the ideology. They will choose the alternative.

But for us to do that effectively, it means that we really have to understand the specific local conditions in which people are living, what the choice is that they feel that they are facing, and to craft policies that are responsive to those conditions. And that's a very difficult thing to do. This struggle against al-Qaida is going to won, really I think, acre by acre, as we've seen in al-Anbar. So as difficult as that is to do it globally acre by acre, the drastic change, I think the drastic and swift change that's taken place in al-Anbar with the surge and with General Petraeus' understanding about the importance of being responsive to local conditions should give us some optimism about the global struggle.
And with that, I'll open it up to questions.

QUESTION: Thank you, Raghubir Goyal, India Globe and Asia Today. Can I, sir, bring your attention to Afghanistan because Secretary Gates was there on Capitol Hill before the congressional arms committee. The people of Afghanistan, of course they've got freedom and they are happy, but now they are somehow unhappy with the Karzai government because al-Qaida's presence is coming back and the Taliban are now coming back. And {Defense} Secretary {Gates} was also saying that he's not very much happy with the way NATO is operating right now. Do you think we are in the verge of shifting some kind of policy or replacing NATO with some other international forces? Or what's going on as far as al-Qaida and Taliban are concerned in Afghanistan because people are really in trouble?

DR. DORAN: With regard to your larger question about the shifting policy, Secretary Gates is on his way to Europe now, or is in Europe now, to discuss with NATO allies Afghanistan. So I think I'll leave that to him to answer.
With regard to the general situation in Afghanistan, the road there is difficult as well and we've seen some resurgence of the Taliban. I would make one little distinction, though, and say that it isn't exactly al-Qaida that's coming back in Afghanistan; it's the Taliban. And with regard to my point about this being a local fight, it's a very significant distinction because I think all indications, both from what people from Afghanistan tell us and what you see in polling and so forth, show that the Afghans themselves do not like the foreign fighters that are coming in, in the same way that the foreign fighters have alienated the Iraqis.
The question in Afghanistan, support for the Taliban, takes you into a question of the different tribal affiliations of Afghanis, of questions of economics and security and so forth. And I would be foolish if I didn't argue that we have a lot more to do in Afghanistan, but I'd just take you back to what I said, that I think the answer is to be found locally. And the fact that the situation in Afghanistan is difficult doesn't mean that things haven't gotten a lot better in Iraq, that doesn't mean that al-Qaida is doing well and it doesn't mean that we don't have a clear way ahead in terms of the approach we take.

QUESTION: As far as foreign fighters are concerned, where are they coming from? Because President Karzai was complaining even when he was here at the White House with President Bush that they are coming from Pakistan and now General Musharraf -- now Mr. President has not done enough as far as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

DR. DORAN: I don't have at my fingertips any precise statistics about the makeup, but there's no doubt that the foreign fighter network is a global network drawn from countries all over the region.

QUESTION: Mounzer Sleiman with Lebanon’s Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi. The success that you're mentioning in Iraq, you associated it with the surge, while there was more -- it is about local solution than being associated with military operations. That would lead to the narrative that has been used by the administration about waging this ideological warfare, the long war. And I think it needs to be examined if the solution to this is not military. But it's based on the local intervention, even with the absence of governments. But this danger, if even when government exists, it's better to be left to the government to deal with it, to the local to deal with it. How about -- do you think it's serving the purpose of throwing words like Islamo-facism and other terms associating with Islam when dealing with ideological warfare against al-Qaida and other extremists?
DR. DORAN: A couple of points here. With regard to the successes in Iraq, I think it's both the courage and commitment of the local population and the Iraqi security services and the surge. Without the surge, I don't think we would have given the capability and the security -- provided the capabilities and the security necessary to be successful against al-Qaida in al-Anbar. There's no doubt that this is a locally generated movement, but it's facilitated by us. So I see it as sort of an alliance.
With regard to your question about Islamo-fascism, I don't think the word is -- I don't think the word is helpful because it doesn't lead us to look at meaningful distinctions that I was describing between the people on the ground and it doesn't help us to understand the perceptions of people on the ground and the choices that they feel they are faced with.
There is an important point, however, that we are dealing with a global ideology. There's no doubt about that. And the thing that is distinctive about this ideology is that Takfirism, I think. That is to say that al-Qaida makes it legitimate for a Muslim individual to designate other Muslims as apostates and to kill them on the basis of that designation. And this is an ideology that's been spread globally and it's what allows them to engage in such indiscriminate use of violence. So we are attacking an ideology, as well, but we would attack it successfully by paying attention to the local conditions and it makes people, even briefly, think that this is somehow going to be an answer for them.
QUESTION: Well, if this is a global ideology, do you think the United States is better equipped in the Western world to deal with this ideology inside -- you know, the extremist inside Islam or Islam itself. The Islamic world itself is the one ultimately who has to deal with this. And when you have a military solution to this kind of conflict, you exacerbate the situation and you make it more difficult to deal because there is always internal dialogue in the Islamic world about the direction they need to be going. And the experience and Iraq, I don't think it's proving that the military solution and intervention is always helpful in this so-called global war or whatever.


DR. DORAN: I think if we divided into, as the military says, direct and indirect actions, -- direct actions being hard and military power -- then I agree with you and I think the military agrees with you 100 percent that the -- that ultimately this will be won through indirect action. And it will be won working together with our Muslim allies. But it is a struggle that we share. It really is a struggle between our Muslim allies -- the vast majority of Muslims who are moderate and opposed to al-Qaida -- and us. It is really people who value -- who share all the same values and respect for human life against those who don't. The indirect lines are going to be the ones in the end that are going to be decisive. There still is a role for military power. And the story of what's happened in Al Anbar over the last, you know, eight to 10 months shows you that military action can be quite effective. It's using it effectively together with the other kinds of power that you're discussing.
QUESTION: About the Islamo-fascism, my understanding that you are -- are you advocating for the Administration to abandon such use and whether this use is going to be continued or not?
DR. DORAN: I'm advocating for all of us to pay close attention to the local conditions, while being aware of the fact that there is a global ideology out there.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) on the narrative or not since you elaborated that this should not be used and it's not helpful, you said.
DR. DORAN: I personally am not going to use it. I'm going to focus on the local conditions.
MODERATOR: We're going to take one more question from here and then I'm going to go to New York.
QUESTION: Roula Ayoubi from BBC Arabic. How happy are you with the performance of the Iraqi Government in responding to the local needs and how do you see the role of this government?
DR. DORAN: The Iraqi Government, particularly the security forces, have been doing wonderful work. Going back to what I just said about this being something that we have to fight together. We are really heartened by what we've seen, both in terms of the Iraqi security services standing up and taking on this fight and also the groups of concerned local citizens who are standing up and asking to be part of the fight and to also take on positions within the security services. So the general trend is positive. I think the experts in the Department of Defense are saying that we have a -- we've got some distance to go -- probably, you know, somewhere in the vicinity of two years before we can see security services that are fully capable of doing this all by themselves. But the trend is very positive.
MODERATOR: Okay. Go ahead, New York.


QUESTION: My name is Sezai Kalayci from Zaman newspapers for Turkey. So, I don't know, do you have any idea about the PKK terrorist group? I want to ask all this reason if it was the PKK or what do you think about the future in Iraq for the PKK terror group?
DR. DORAN: Thanks. I can only quote the President on that question and say that we share with the Turkish Government a deep concern about the PKK and we share that concern together with the Iraqi Government. And we are looking forward to cooperating with the Turkish Government and with the Iraqi Government to bringing a resolution to the problem.
QUESTION: Hi, my name is Arshad Mahmud and I represent the daily Prothom Alo of Bangladesh. Your title says that you are the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy and I expected you to focus more on how public diplomacy can help the problems related to al-Qaida and other extremist groups. And I agree with this gentleman that you attached more importance to the success of the surge in undercutting al-Qaida.
Do you personally feel -- and I also see that you are from the academia, you were a professor at Princeton. Do you sincerely believe that the military might can actually defeat these problems? Because worldwide, the American foreign policy is perceived to be lopsided: It helps the people like Israel, the Government of Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians; and also, it supports the repressive regimes in the Middle East. And that's how all these al-Qaida and other groups have come up. And if you even -- I take for argument's sake that if you defeat them, there will be another group that will be launched from somewhere else because they are fed up with these kind of policies. And how you do deal with this as a person from public diplomacy? Thank you.

DR. DORAN: Well, public diplomacy is about listening to people as well as explaining our own -- our policies to them. And what I was just advocating here was that we need to listen very carefully to what people are saying locally and that these local concerns are as important for understanding people's perceptions of the United States.
The view that you just presented about the perception of the United States, I don't think is accurate. And I think the events in al-Anbar really refute what -- the position that you just described, because our policy toward Israel hasn't changed in the last eight months. And yet, we have thousands and thousands of Muslims in al-Anbar who, just a few months ago, were hostile to the United States, who have shifted and are now cooperating with it openly and freely.
So you know, it's not the big picture that changed there. What changed was, I think, our understanding of local needs and the way in which we engaged with the local population. What we're really dealing with there is not -- the deepest sources of hostility to the United States in Iraq have to do with Iraqis' perception of the Iraqi political system and their place in it. I mean, this is a very local question about who is going to run Iraq and what processes they're going to use to do that. And it was our understanding of that, I think, and our engagement with local people about their concerns that allowed us to provide the security that then gave them the ability to counter al-Qaida.
QUESTION: Can I follow that up? I mean, don't you believe -- because I read, all the experts are saying that military solution is not the solution; we have to deal with other issues. That's precisely the --
DR. DORAN: Yeah, that's absolutely the case that the -- that this problem -- this problem cannot be solved purely by military or even primarily by military means. It's -- as I said to the other gentleman, it has to be solved first through indirect means by working with our allies in a number of different ways. But there still is a role; we can't escape the fact that there is a hardened core of al-Qaida operatives out there who are going to use violence against us regardless of our policies. And in dealing with them, I think the military tool is an important tool.

MODERATOR: Okay. We'll go to New York next. I would ask that you try to limit follow-up until everyone here has had a chance to ask their question. But go ahead and we'll get to everyone that we possibly can.
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Sara Hussein and I work for the Saudi Press Agency. Talking about different methods that you could use aside from military might, I wanted to ask you about the Saudis' so-called rehabilitation program. I assume that you're familiar with it. And I wonder whether you could discuss at all about your opinion of the program and whether you think it provides some kind of model for an alternative to -- or a way to counter ideology and whether you believe that the Takfiri ideology or a follower of that ideology can be rehabilitated.
DR. DORAN: I don't have at my fingertips a lot of details about the Saudi program. What you can see, though, is that there's been -- what I can see quite clearly is that has been, in the last two years, a very significant effort on the part of the Saudi Government to combat the ideology and also to limit the flow of finances to this global network. And we see, you know, clear benefits on a number of levels from those efforts.
The -- I think when you start talking -- if I just can address your question in sort of general terms, when you talk to specific representatives of specific countries, you find that the local conditions make it difficult to come up with a one size fits all method for dealing with this ideology. You know, the methods that the Government of Singapore use are not going to be the same as the Government of Egypt. They're not going to be the same as the Government of Saudi Arabia. So I don't know that we can look at the Saudi example and say that we can apply that elsewhere and especially us, the United States. But we're certainly happy to see what they're doing.

MODERATOR: I'm going to go with New York. Go ahead, New York.
QUESTION: Yury Saykin, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, of Russia: Have you ever heard about al-Qaida activity in Africa or Latin America?

DR. DORAN: I'm sorry, have I heard about al-Qaida activity in Africa and in Latin America?
QUESTION: Yeah, right.
DR. DORAN: Sure, al-Qaida activity in North Africa, we can see on the headlines of the papers today. In sub-Saharan Africa, there is activity, certainly. As far as Latin America, I do not myself -- I haven't myself heard of significant al-Qaida activity there, but I'm not a great expert, so I'd prefer if you didn't quote me as saying that. There may well be, but I'd refer you to some of our Latin America experts and some of our counterterrorism experts to see whether they're there. They're certainly working around the globe so I would assume they're there, but I don't have any information about that.

QUESTION: Umit Enginsoy with Turkish NTV Television. Just one on the PKK, which the President has qualified as a common enemy of the United States, Iraq and Turkey. You say the war on al-Qaida will be won on the local level, and this includes military and non-military elements. And together with the surge, you have also employed some new counterinsurgency tactics and policies. Actually, some of them are given in this famous book. The thing is, I was wondering, if you are -- and you have also increased intelligence sharing and other -- closer talks with the Turks for cooperation in PKK.
Now, when talking to the Turks, are you talking about your experience, your counterinsurgency tactics? Are you advising them anything that could be useful for the fight against PKK?

DR. DORAN: I think that counterinsurgency doctrine points you in the direction that I was discussing; that is to say, it points you to the local community and it sees the fight against terrorism as a fight for the loyalty of the local community. So I think that's a principle that's a good one to start with everywhere.
As far as the specifics about the negotiations with the Turks, I would defer -- I would refer you to those who are carrying out those negotiations to see what they're saying.
QUESTION: This seems to be the basic question because I'm just interested in the al-Qaida. So can you tell me -- this is Sang Min Lee from South Korea’s Future Korea Journal. Can you tell me, how do you understand the al-Qaida ideology? How can you define about al-Qaida ideology? And then I think to counter the al-Qaida ideology, we must understand what caused al-Qaida to spread out over the world. So what do you think are the main cause to the al-Qaida ideology spread all over the world?
DR. DORAN: Right. Let me start with the distinctive characteristics of the ideology. I think there are three. I certainly hope there are three. I can get to one and two, and maybe three will come as I'm talking.


The first one is the Takfirism, as I said before, the branding other Muslims as non-Muslims. Everything that they do flows from that. They say that the leaders of Muslim states are not Muslims because they're carrying out laws other than the Sharia, therefore they're apostates, therefore they can be killed. The individuals who are cooperating with those states or working for them or working for apostates instead of for Muslims, and therefore they are apostates themselves and can be killed, and so on and so forth. They say that it is incumbent upon -- that the Islamic world is under threat from the West, and from the United States in particular, and it's the duty of every Muslim to take up a position of defense, as they see it, against the West. So that's the first element.
The second element, I think, is the notion of a vanguard. They have taken this -- you know, this is something for scholars to go look at. I don't know exactly where it's come from, but they've taken some traditions, some canonical Islamic traditions, and from that fashioned the notion that there will always be at any time in history a very small group of true Muslims whose job it is to pave the way for the rest of the community. A kind of victorious sect is what they call it. And this -- so what this victorious sect is a vanguard whose job it is to lead the rest of the world out of this darkness that it's in -- the rest of the Islamic world.
The third component, I think, is this secret cellular struggle or the secret cellular organization. That's not really part of the ideology, but the ideology encourages the creation of it.
Now, why is it spread all over the world? It's, I think, the simplicity of the message together with the notion of vanguard makes it very attractive. I think the simplicity of the message, the call to violence and the notion of a vanguard makes it very attractive to people. It's a message that can be translated -- a global message that can be translated into local circumstances very, very easily. Because what it says to an individual is the Muslim world, the Islamic community, is under threat; the threat is grave; the very existence of the Islamic community is at stake; and the only way to save it is to take drastic action now.
So it divides the world up into black and white; it says who's on the black side, who's on the white side, and it says here's how we do things. And that message has appeal to a lot of people in a lot of different circumstances. If you are just a young man who is confused in Europe and you're uncertain of your identity, you're uncertain of your place in the world, and suddenly you're presented with this option of adopting a path that will make you a hero for your people, that will allow you to express some of the violent feelings that you may have, then it's attractive to you. If you're just a thug and you just want to commit acts of violence and have people tell you you're doing a good thing, it's going to be attractive to you. And so on and so forth. I mean, in some places like in al-Anbar, you see that there are people who have a set of local concerns, local concerns that feel under threat and who may feel that a temporary alliance with al-Qaida is useful because they see some benefit to themselves from the violence of al-Qaida. And so they'll make a temporary deal. That's what we saw. That was what was happening with some of the groups in al-Anbar prior to the -- prior to General Petraeus' set of policies. So it's very adaptable to a lot of different characteristics, a lot of different circumstances.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is David Morgan. I'm with Reuters. And I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the bombings in Algeria this week and it would be interesting to know your views on what you think al-Qaida in Maghreb is trying to accomplish, what its intents are locally, what sort of messages it seems to be sending out through this sort of action and what possible implications there may be for Europe.
DR. DORAN: I think that one of the reasons -- we look at it from a global point of view. One of the reasons for these actions is an attempt by al-Qaida to get back in the headlines. One of the purposes of any bombing by a terrorist group is just to -- is just publicity and to get their message out through the publicity. So I think that the organization as a whole has been suffering of late as a result of some of the successes that we've had in Iraq and so wants to grab the headlines again.
It's interesting to note, you know, al-Qaida would like us -- would like Muslims in the world as a whole to see it as it sees itself; that is, as the vanguard representing true Islam to all Muslims. And as part of creating that perception, it has a policy of carrying out mergers with local groups. So it merged with the group in Algeria to form al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and it recently merged with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
It's doing that to try to suggest that it's moving forward rather than backward. The recent merger with the LIFG is an interesting one, because the LIFG is a very small group, and so the significance, the overall significance, of that merger is not great. I mean, it doesn't create the perception of a movement that is sweeping North Africa.
The effect for -- the implications for Europe are significant, however, because when a little group, even a little group like the LIFG merges with a group like al-Qaida, we see a couple of things happen. One is you see, at least on the basis of the example of the AQIM, you see debates within the leadership about the desirability of aligning with al-Qaida.
In the AQIM we had a division between those who thought this was a good way to go and those who argued against it. Those who argued against it argued against it very much for the reasons that I gave here about why people rejected al-Qaida in al-Anbar: They believe it won't be responsive to local conditions; they believe that it's going to bring down the wrath of the local population on them for carrying out indiscriminate killing. And then you have others that believe in the global mission of al-Qaida and they take it in a different direction.
That has a lot of serious implications for Europe, because those small groups, despite being small, are still lethal, lethal and dangerous. And Europe has lots of North Africans in it, so it creates a threat, an additional threat, for the Europeans.

MODERATOR: We have time for one or two more questions.
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Naseem Stanazai. I work for Voice of America Afghanistan Service.
As you know, sir, in Afghanistan there are -- more than 55 percent of the population are Pashtuns. And on the other side of the border, in Waziristan (inaudible) probably over 30 millions are Pashtuns. And Taliban and al-Qaida are roaming in that -- those areas. And one of the reason that they reorganized or regrouped could be the local populations help with them.
Is there any -- and recently we heard that there could be some sort of diplomatic solution or peace with them. But in al-Anbar, as you said, the people have their local concerns. So these people also have their local concerns. Is there any active diplomacy going on that at least al-Qaida can be separated from Taliban in those areas?
DR. DORAN: I think on that I'll defer you to the people who are most closely involved with the negotiations with the Pakistanis and with the Afghan Government. That falls a little bit outside of my area of expertise.
MODERATOR: Thank you all for your time, and thank you, Sir, for your remarks. This event is now concluded.
DR. DORAN: Thanks very much

Mother Of All ClueBats Needed! Hello, CENTCOM..? CAIR...Is Not-Repeat NOT! Your Friend...copy..CENTCOM?

United States Central Command

From website Americans Against Hate this announcement that CentCom had invited the Holy land unindicted co-conspirators to give a speech. (picks jaw off floor)

CAIR SPEECH AT CENTCOM CANCELLED

ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING CALL AND E-MAIL FROM
AMERICANS AGAINST HATE

(Coral Springs, FL) Yesterday, the Department of Defense: Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that its upcoming event featuring a speech by CAIR-Tampa Executive Director Ahmed Bedier was cancelled or, as CENTCOM put it, “postponed” with no future date planned. The event had originally been scheduled for Tuesday, January 15th. A CENTCOM representative stated that there was no reason given for the “postponement.”

The cancellation occurred after a phone conversation on Thursday took place between Americans Against Hate (AAH) Chairman Joe Kaufman and a CENTCOM official, who said that he would bring the matter up for discussion.

AAH had discovered that Bedier was set to speak at the government agency from a posting on the website of radio talk show host Michael Savage. According to Savage’s information, Bedier was going to speak about such controversial topics as jihad, martyrdom and dhimmitude (serving as a non-Muslim under Muslim rule), followed by a “question and answer session.”

At the behest of the official, Kaufman sent him an e-mail stating his specific concerns. The e-mail read in part, “[I]t would be wrong for CENTCOM to host Ahmed Bedier from CAIR this coming Tuesday, given CAIR’s extensive ties to terrorist organizations... Please reconsider allowing Mr. Bedier to speak to your personnel on Tuesday the 15th or anytime in the future. CENTCOM should be fighting terrorists, not embracing their friends.”

As well, in the e-mail, Kaufman made mention of the fact that CENTCOM had previously hosted Ramadan Shallah, a colleague of Sami Al-Arian and who later became the head of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Given Bedier’s own ties to Al-Arian, Kaufman asked, “Why do you want a repeat performance?”

Americans Against Hate praises CENTCOM for no longer having this event with CAIR and hopes the government agency exercises better judgment as to who it invites to speak for upcoming CENTCOM events.

Feminist Magazine Says Drop Dead to Three Prominent Israeli Women Ad

Beats me why Israel is shocked, shocked I tell you, by the rejection of an ad featuring three prominent Israeli women by Ms Magazine. Could it be that they haven't been paying attention. Humm...could be. Lets see where was Ms Magazine on the issue of Muslim women beatings? Absent? Ok, how about on Muslim women getting their G-spot hacked off....no...absent here too. Well, how about Iraqi women getting to vote...No...Saudi women treated as chattel .....having less rights than a stray dog! No NO!NO!NO! Nothing Nada, Nyet,
ok
So exactly
why
should
Israeli Women be
different?

Here's your ad.
Save your
$3,800.00
Welcome to the American
left wing.

Why Stephen Coughlin Was Fired: Oh, for taking Jidhadist at the word.

Mr. Islam and other "middle-grounders" don't Mr. Coughlin's message getting any traction and so, of course, any plain speakers will have to be, you understand....removed...disturbs the sleeping citizens.

If the Enemy in the War on Terror (WOT) states that he fights jihad in furtherance of Islamic causes that includes the imposition of Shari'a law and the re-establishment of the Caliphate; And Islamic law on jihad exists and is available in English; Then Professionals with WOT responsibilities have an affirmative, personal, professional duty to know the enemy that includes ALL the knowable facts associated with the law of jihad.

@American Thinker by By Andrew G. Bostom

Bill Gertz, Washington Times national security columnist, reported that the Pentagon has fired Stephen Coughlin, its most knowledgeable specialist on Islamic Law, and jihad terrorism. As Gertz observed aptly, the Pentagon thus ended the career of its most effective analyst attempting to prepare the military to wage ideological war against jihadism.

This past September, 2007, I lectured with Mr. Coughlin, a US Army Reserves Major, at The Naval War College, and witnessed his brilliant, tour de force presentation which elucidated the reliance of contemporary jihadism on Islamic Law. Coughlin demonstrated meticulously that "Jihad fi Sabil Allah"-"Jihad in the cause of Allah," is the animating principle which underlies the threat of global jihad terrorism, and how this understanding should form the basis for rational, effective threat development assessment, and war planning.

That Coughlin's analyses would even be considered "controversial," or worse still lead eventually to his firing-perhaps, as Gertz strongly suggests, at the behest of a Muslim aide, Hesham Islam, within the office of Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England-is pathognomonic of the intellectual and moral rot plaguing our efforts to combat global jihadism.

There is no evidence that Mr. Islam-distinctly unlike Mr. Coughlin-has any specific expertise on the theory or historical practice of jihad; indeed Gordon England's Egyptian Muslim aide is touted for his public relations skills-a sort of English-speaking Muslim Dragoman to the global Islamic umma. According to Deputy Secretary England,

Hesham [Islam] helps me understand people's different perspectives and how they see things. He has a cultural background that's very helpful, but he also works at it very hard to get a better understanding of people and how they think.

Coughlin's reasoned conclusions simply update and complement, exquisitely, what serious scholars of jihad have long argued about revivalist movements throughout Islamic history. For example, forty years ago (in 1967), John Ralph Willis observed regarding the 19^th century jihadist movements in West Africa, specifically, and such historical movements in general,

The jihad...is essentially an instrument of revival, employed for the purpose of extending the frontiers of Islam and leading the faithful back to roots. And it is not insignificant that the faithful, being in essence conservative, have been as susceptible to the summons of revivalists as they have been insensitive to the activity of reformists.

Stephen Coughlin's modern predicament is eerily similar to what befell another courageous, unabashed American patriot, William Eaton, two hundred years ago, during our nation's first encounter with jihad terrorism. "Victory in Tripoli," Joshua London's compelling narrative of America's initial conflict with jihadists-the Barbary wars-highlights, appositely, William Eaton's experiences. Eaton's triumphs and travails during his tenure as consul to Tunis (1799-1803), and later U.S. naval agent to the Barbary states, mirrored those of the young American nation he served.

Born on February 23, 1764 in Woodstock, Connecticut, the highly intelligent and strong-willed Eaton, when 16 years old, ran away from home, subsequently lying about his age to join Washington's Continental Army. He rose to the rank of sergeant in the Continental Army, which he served until 1783. Eaton graduated Dartmouth in 1790, and in 1791 was chosen clerk of the Massachusetts House of Delegates, where he remained until 1797, while he also served (beginning in 1792) the U.S. Army as both a fighter and negotiator during the frontier campaigns against the American Indians. Later, Eaton assisted then Secretary of War Timothy Pickering's espionage/treason investigations. When Pickering became Secretary of State, he chose Eaton to serve as U.S. consul to Tunis, initially under President John Adams.

Eaton's consular journal recorded these brutally honest and comical impressions of his first diplomatic encounter (on February 22, 1799) with Dey Bobba Mustafa of Algiers, which would make the craven State Department mandarins of today, wince:

...we took off our shoes and entering the cave (for so it seemed), with small apertures of light with iron gates, we were shown to a huge, shaggy beast, sitting on his rump upon a low bench covered with a cushion of embroidered velvet, with his hind legs gathered up like a tailor, or a bear. On our approach to him, he reached out his forepaw as if to receive something to eat. Our guide exclaimed, "Kiss the Dey's hand!" The consul general bowed very elegantly, and kissed it, and we followed his example in succession. The animal seemed at that moment to be in a harmless mode; he grinned several times, but made very little noise. Having performed this ceremony, and standing a few moments in silent agony, we had leave to take our shoes and other property, and leave the den without any other injury than the humility of being obliged in this involuntary manner, to violate the second commandment of God and offend common decency. Can any man believe that this elevated brute has seven kings of Europe, two republics, and a continent tributary to him when his whole naval force is not equal to two line-of-battle ships? It is so.

Despite such inauspicious beginnings, and the institutionalized Barbary corruption Eaton found so repugnant to his person, and nation, his negotiations eventually secured U.S. commercial interests (at least a temporary) immunity from the attacks of Tunisian corsairs.

Eaton agonized over the gulf between the enormous potential and depressing reality of the Barbary states. He admired the Mediterranean coast of Tunis, "...naturally luxuriant and beautiful beyond description...I know not why it might not vie with the opposite continent in every thing useful, rich, and elegant", yet despaired of the stultifying religio-political institutions which arrested the regions progress. Ultimately, Eaton concluded that Islam itself, certainly as practiced in Barbary, was the source of this backwardness:

Considered as a nation, they are deplorably wretched, because they have no property in the soil to inspire an ambition to cultivate it. They are abject slaves to the despotism of their government, and they are humiliated by tyranny, the worst of all tyrannies, the despotism of priestcraft. They live in more solemn fear of the frowns of a bigot who has been dead and rotten above a thousand years, than of the living despot whose frown would cost them their lives...The ignorance, superstitious tradition and civil and religious tyranny, which depress the human mind here, exclude improvement of every kind...

Appointed Naval Agent for the Barbary Regencies in 1804, Eaton then organized and led an expedition to unseat the predatory Barbary ruler Yusuf Qaramanli. Eaton's army arrived outside Derna. on April 25, 1805. When the bey of Derna refused his generous ultimatum, at 2 p.m. April 28, Eaton led a successful attack on the city, supported by U.S. naval gunfire. During the fighting Eaton-who had led his outnumbered force in a gallant bayonet charge-was wounded in the left wrist. As London recounts:

He simply wrapped his arm in a makeshift bandage and sling, grabbed a pistol with his right hand, and continued to charge ahead. With the American Marines in the lead, Eaton's forces stormed the ramparts and advanced straight to the harbor.

Subsequent diplomatic efforts stalled the expedition. Tobias Lear, the Consul General, reached an accomodation with Yusuf Qaramanli, which included ransom money for all American prisoners, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Derna, and the betrayal of Eaton's key Arab ally, Ahmad Qaramanli. Eaton commented upon this treaty with predictable bitterness in a letter to Commodore John Rodgers:

Could I have apprehended this result of my exertions, certainly no consideration would have prevailed on me to have taken an agency in a tragedy so manifestly fraught with intrigue, so wounding to human feelings, and, as I must view it, so degrading to our national honor.

Although the Senate ratified the Tripoli treaty in April 1806 by a vote of 21 to 8, as London notes,

Jefferson declared ‘victory,' but the ‘peace' proved rather political...The Federalists did not manage to derail the treaty, but they did embarrass and, at junctures, discredit President Thomas Jefferson and forever tarnish the career of Tobias Lear.

Just over five years later, in Brimfield, Massachusetts, June 1, 1811, an alcoholic forty-seven year old William Eaton died in near anonymity.

The signing of the Treaty of Ghent (Christmas eve, 1814)-subsequently ratified in the U.S. (February, 1815)-ended the so-called War of 1812 with Great Britain, and allowed President James Madison to address the problem of renewed Barbary jihad terrorism. Shortly afterward, President Madison commissioned two naval squadrons led by Commodores William Bainbridge and Stephen Decatur, and dispatched them to the Barbary States in May, 1815. By June/July 1815 the ably commanded U.S. naval forces had dealt their Barbary jihadist adversaries a quick series of crushing defeats. These U.S. victories were solidified by what London terms "unprecedented" treaty agreements forced upon the Barbary states, which "..made practically no concessions and stood very firm on every point"-the abolition of all tribute; release of all American prisoners currently held, and acknowledgement that no future American prisoners of war could be enslaved; the payment of indemnities; and the restoration of American properties held by the dey.

Joshua London concludes his engrossing, carefully researched account of the Barbary wars with this insightful analysis:

During the war with Tripoli, the United States began to test William Eaton's hypothesis that fighting back and protecting the national honor and national interest with force was the best way to end Barbary piracy. Just at the moment of triumph, however, President Thomas Jefferson wavered and settled on the side of expediency. Jefferson's lack of resolve left American interests unguarded, and once again American maritime trade felt the Barbary terror. By 1816, however, the United States finally provided that William Eaton was right. This success ignited the imagination of the Old World powers to rise up against the Barbary pirates.

Thirty years earlier, in 1786, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, then serving as American ambassadors to France and Britain, respectively, met in London with the Tripolitan Ambassador to Britain, Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja. These future American presidents were attempting to negotiate a peace treaty which would spare the United States the ravages of jihad piracy-murder, enslavement (with ransoming for redemption), and expropriation of valuable commercial assets-emanating from the Barbary states (modern Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). During their discussions, they questioned Ambassador Adja as to the source of the unprovoked animus directed at the nascent United States republic. Jefferson and Adams, in their subsequent report to the Continental Congress, recorded the Tripolitan Ambassador's justification:

... that it was founded on the Laws of their Prophet, that it was written in their Koran, that all nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as Prisoners, and that every Mussulman who should be slain in Battle was sure to go to Paradise

Stephen Coughlin understands and enunciates what was stated openly to then Ambassadors John Adams and Thomas Jefferson-and what they apparently understood-by the Tripolitan Ambassador Adja. During his September. 2007 presentation which I witnessed at the US Naval War College, Coughlin updated this timeless Islamic formulation into its modern context:

If the Enemy in the War on Terror (WOT) states that he fights jihad in furtherance of Islamic causes that includes the imposition of Shari'a law and the re-establishment of the Caliphate; And Islamic law on jihad exists and is available in English; Then Professionals with WOT responsibilities have an affirmative, personal, professional duty to know the enemy that includes ALL the knowable facts associated with the law of jihad.

And Coughlin, a well-trained lawyer, further argued that such understanding by our military leaders is obligatory if they are to uphold their essential commission:

This is the Professional Standard.

Stephen Coughlin has been fired for reminding his peers of this basic obligation.

Two hundred years after William Eaton's bitter, tragic experiences, and ultimate posthumous vindication, let us fervently hope that our contemporary military and political elites muster the intellectual courage to heed Major Stephen Coughlin's advice in a much more timely, and responsible manner.

Andrew G. Bostom is the author of The Legacy of Jihad (Prometheus, 2005) and The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism " (Prometheus, November, 2007)

Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/01/eaton_agonistes_redux.html at January 10, 2008 - 12:09:12 PM EST