Stay In Touch II via Carl Because We're Here Boy, No One Else

Stay In Touch is Carl's Post today. On a trip to Germany he ran up against a Iraqi 'terp. They exchange yada, yadas, and war stories and soon the terp brings out the punch list. For those of you not in the trades--a punch list is a list of proofreading errors or in construction--a list of do-overs-honeydews jobs that are done after the entire job is done. Usually little jobs. Broken pane. A clipped tile. A screen with a hole. A door jamb that will not let the door close. Little crap that needs attention before the invoice gets paid. In the trades a savvy super will NOT pay the FINAL invoice until the honeydews have been fixed. Nothing personal. Just Business. If you are dumb enough to pay your invoice in full you will go to the end of the line when you present your "could you come back and fix the yada-yada?" Well, sweet Mary, Jesus, and Joseph OMG!---Iraq has a punch list. Live by the COIN-FM-3.24 and punch list by the COIN-FM-3.24. The Terp has a point. A big one.

CARL:"We were talking about various things to do with the conflict here and he said something very revealing about how cultural differences can have an effect upon the war."

"American military commanders and local police and Army commanders work very closely here; the closer the cooperation, the more both sides benefit. We have the firepower and logistics and they know who is who and where they are. The interpreter said the local police and Army commanders are very proud of their relationships with American Soldiers and Marines. The photo they have taken with their American counterparts they will display prominently on their walls and they will cherish (the interpreter's word) it."

"Then the American commander they worked with will leave at the end of his tour. And he won't keep in touch, no random e-mail, nor the occasional phone call. Normal for us, we work with somebody in a place on a job, and when we leave, we leave. Not normal for the local police and Army people. When the men they have worked with so closely don't contact them after leaving, they feel slighted. Their feelings are hurt."

Their feelings are hurt:
"When it comes to mobility I think Americans have it down cold. For Americans mobility is like the water in the gold fish bowl. Don't even think about it. Excuse me. How did we get here. Mayflower. Then boogie outside the city limits. Elbow room. Emigrant trail. Move on. However--- "mobility" is not the same for everyone. I discovered this on a fishing trip with a college classmate. At the lake where we were fishing I ran into a Marine from my unit in VN. The last time I had seen him was after the Tet Offensive which Walter "nose bleed" Cronkite said we lost. Recognized him right away. Four years or more since I had last seen his ass. No big deal. Say hey and like that. Who made it out. Who didn't. Who lost his ass. Who didn't. That kind of stuff. No biggie. I spilt my beers with him. We talked on forever. When it was time for us to leave--said see ya' and off we went back to the campus.

On the ride back , however, my classmate started started quizing with questions that said that "what was no big deal to you dummy is anomaly to the rest of us aka civilians." The big HUH? was written all over my face as I looked at him and wonder what strange bug had crawled up his tuckass. Excuse me, he says, but you talked to him like there was no time-no space-like it had been five minutes since you had last seen him-instead of the four or five years. Civilians, he said, do not react that way--veterans do.

Ok. Ok. No Problem. Put it on my punch list. STAY IN TOUCH.

On the Influence of Bureaucracy Upon Innovation and Adaption

The resistance four star General James Cartwright experienced with the simple introduction of a "blog" into the infrastructure of a military bureaucracy to encourage faster communication between the ranks started my thinking about other events where the influence of bureaucracy might have played an even more crucial roles such as the Vietnam War. You know, if you keep beating the search engines with the same nut in slightly different ways you eventually will hit the jackpot and pop open a surprise that exceeds all expectations.

My surprise was the discovery of Robert W. Komer, President Johnson's point man in Vietnam, who in 1972 wrote "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam"

Rand Report:

Kromer's book is a sad but wiser look at the impact of institutional factors on the U.S./GVN response in Vietnam. An atypical conflict being handled by institutions designed for other purposes but reluctant to get involved as well. Komer highlights such constraints as "institutional inertia — the inherent reluctance of organizations to change operational methods except slowly and incrementally — influenced not only the decisions made but what was actually done in the field. These constraints lead to

1. an overly militarized response;
2. diffusion of authority and fragmentation of command;
3. hesitation to change the traditional relationship of civilian to military leadership
4. agency reluctance to violate the conventional lines dividing responsibilities.

FM 3.24 makes a lot more sense to me now that the context for clear and hold is placed in historical view. All the ideas that are now being bandied about like so much confetti were known and realized then---even before Tet. However, it was only after Tet that Pacification, clear and hold was taken seriously enough to implement and funded. But by that that time the clock was ticking off the final fourth quarter and we will never know if the program had been installed and supported in the first years would have worked. Kromers analysis is a must read as context for FM 3.24. You'll get a much better understanding of the ideas if you read Kromer first. To me the read was an astonishing been there, done that, here's why it worked, here's why it failed.
A heartbreaking work in view of all our losses and a deeper appreciation of how much work and energy it takes to reverse course on an Iceberg or a bureaucracy.

The And Improved 3-24 for Making Friends and Killing Vampire Orcs Is Here

The new 3-24 is out and Ralph Peters gives it a thumbs up. The New and Improved 3-24 doesn't make him throw up too much. At least, he says, they tossed out the warm, soft and cuddly parts the Army still hugged from their Clintonista Days. They had to, he says, Marines do not forget the prime directive: Kill Orcs. Actually, 3-24, is just a start. Better than nothing. But just one book in a 30 unit program. I found David Kilcullen's Twenty Eight Articles and you better start here before reading 3-24.
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FM 3-24 "Dishonest and Cowardly" "Terrific Manual to Refight Vietnam 1963" : Peters

FM 3-24 will be out, supposedly, in its final version next month and already Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine for Killing Jihad Jockeys and their thugmasters is getting less than rave reviews from Retired LtCol Ralph Peters. Peters, not one to sugar coat his views calls FM 3-24" .... dishonest and cowardly." Peters is outraged that the military establishment is pussy footing with politically correct opinions that could lead to needless American casualities by ignoring the fact that we are at war with faith based terrorism. " the doctrine ignores faith-inspired terrorism and skirts ethnic issues in favor of analyzing yesteryear's political insurgencies. It would be a terrific manual if we returned to Vietnam circa 1963, but its recommendations are profoundly misguided when it comes to fighting terrorists intoxicated with religious visions and the smell of blood." "Islamist terrorists who regard death as a promotion are not going to reject their faith any more than an ethnic warrior can - or would wish to - change his blood identity." Peters has a point and a damn good one. Repeatedly, the jihad thuggies and their thugmasters have clearly stated their mission and precisely how they are going to accomplish same. But as Peters states: "...the doctrine writers ignored today's reality."

"Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have stated explicitly and repeatedly that they're waging a global jihad to re-establish the caliphate. Yet the new manual ignores religious belief as a motivation." (FM 3-24) is....morally frivolous and intellectually inert, a pathetic rehashing of yesteryear's discredited "wisdom" on counterinsurgencies and, worst of all, driven by a stalker-quality infatuation with T.E. Lawrence, "Lawrence of Arabia," who not only was a huckster of the first order, but whose "revolt in the desert" was a near-meaningless sideshow of a sideshow."