Orc TTP and Ambush Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Michael Yon post: the eagle went over the mountain power point on Ambush tactics against U.S.Marines needs to be read and reread and shared with all. This is the fundamentals of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and it all has to be in muscle memory before you deploy. The Orc does not waste anything. Even the aggressive spirit of the Marine is used as sucker bait to entice your team into a dead end zone where murder awaits. Read.

Lt.Andrew Grayson: Not Guilty on all counts from Haditha Firefight

On Wednesday, First Lt. Andrew Grayson was found not guilty of lying to cover up evidence from Haditha and of attempting to get his DD214 separation from service papers while under investigation. Lt. Grayson was not at the Haditha firefight. The court martial panel found him not guilty of all charges. There were originally eight Haditha Marines, four enlisted and four officers, under investigation for various court martial charges. Five Marines have had charges dropped. The blotched Haditha investigation will continue with the trials of Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich,accused of ordering the killings, and LtCol. Jeffrey Chessani, of failure to investigate the deaths of Iraqi civilians. In the trial of LtCol. Chessani the prosecution has been accused by the court martial panel of attempting to sandbag the case against LtCol. Chessani. The panel has warned the prosecution that their attempts to gain a twofer reeks of evidence of the “mortal enemy of military justice.”: unlawful command influence. " aka their chief witness Marine lawyer Colonel John Ewers, was permitted to attend numerous, closed-session meetings in which LtCol Chessani’s case was discussed with the Generals and other legal beagles.

A Letter to the 7th Diplomats @ The Dipnote official blog for the State Department

John Matel is a career Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who is currently serving as the team leader of the Provincial Reconstruction Team embedded in Al Asad, Al Anbar Province.

I just finished reading a news article discussing some of my FSO colleagues' vehement and emotional response to the idea that a few of us might have directed assignments in Iraq . To my vexed and overwrought colleagues, I say take a deep breath and calm down. I have been here for a while now, and you may have been misinformed about life at a PRT.

I personally dislike the whole idea of forced assignments, but we do have to do our jobs. We signed up to be worldwide available. All of us volunteered for this kind of work and we have enjoyed a pretty sweet lifestyle most of our careers.

I will not repeat what the Marines say when I bring up this subject. I tell them that most FSOs are not wimps and weenies. I will not share this article with them and I hope they do not see it. How could I explain this wailing and gnashing of teeth? I just tried to explain it to one of my PRT members, a reserve LtCol called up to serve in Iraq . She asked me if all FSOs would get the R&R, extra pay etc. and if it was our job to do things like this. When I answered in the affirmative, she just rolled her eyes.

Calling Iraq a death sentence is just way over the top. I volunteered to come here aware of the risks but confident that I will come safely home, as do the vast majority of soldiers and Marines, who have a lot riskier jobs than we FSOs do.

I wrote a post a couple days ago where I said that perhaps everyone's talents are not best employed in Iraq . That is still true. But I find the sentiments expressed by some at the town hall meeting deeply offensive. What are they implying about me and my choice? And what do they say to our colleagues in the military, who left friends and family to come here and do their jobs? As diplomats, part of our work is to foster peace and understanding. We cannot always be assured that we will serve only in places where peace and understanding are already safely established.


If these guys at the town hall meeting do not want to come to Iraq , that is okay with. I would not want that sort out here with me anyway. We have enough trouble w/o having to baby sit. BUT they are not worldwide available and they might consider the type of job that does not require worldwide availability.


We all know that few FSOs will REALLY be forced to come to Iraq anyway. Our system really does not work like that. This sound and fury at Foggy Bottom truly signifies nothing. Get over it! I do not think many Americans feel sorry for us and it is embarrassing for people with our privileges to paint ourselves as victims.

"It remains the greatest of honors to serve with you.":David H. Petraeus, General, United States Army Commanding

HEADQUARTERS MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ BAGHDAD, IRAQ APO AE
7 September 2007 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq We are now over two-and-a-half months into the surge of offensive operations made possible by the surge of forces, and I want to share with you my view of how I think we’re doing. This letter is a bit longer than previous ones, since I feel you deserve a detailed description of what I believe we have – and have not – accomplished, as Ambassador Crocker and I finalize the assessment we will provide shortly to Congress. Up front, my sense is that we have achieved tactical momentum and wrested the initiative from our enemies in a number of areas of Iraq. The result has been progress in the security arena, although it has, as you know, been uneven. Additionally, as you all appreciate very well, innumerable tasks remain and much hard work lies ahead. We are, in short, a long way from the goal line, but we do have the ball and we are driving down the field. We face a situation that is exceedingly complex. Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists, some supported by Iran, continue to carry out attacks on us, our Iraqi partners, and the Iraqi civilians we seek to secure. We have to contend with the relentless pace of operations, the crushing heat, and the emotions that we all experience during long deployments and tough combat. And we operate against a backdrop of limited Iraqi government capacity, institutions trying to rebuild, and various forms of corruption. All of this takes place in a climate of distrust and fear that stems from the sectarian violence that did so much damage to the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and into 2007, not to mention the decades of repression under Saddam’s brutal regime. Tragically, sectarian violence continues to cause death and displacement in Baghdad and elsewhere, albeit at considerably reduced levels from 8 months ago, due, in large part, to your hard work and sacrifice together with our Iraqi counterparts. In spite of these challenges, our operations – particularly the offensive operations we have conducted since mid-June – have helped produce progress in many areas on the ground. In fact, the number of attacks across the country has declined in 8 of the past 11 weeks, reaching during the last week in August a level not seen since June 2006. This trend is not just a result of greater numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces; it also reflects your determination, courage, and skill in conducting counterinsurgency operations. By taking the fight to the enemy, you have killed or captured dozens of leaders and thousands of members of Al Qaeda-Iraq and extremist militia elements, you have taken many of Al Qaeda’s former sanctuaries away from them, and you have dismantled a number of their car bomb and improvised explosive device networks. By living among the population with our Iraqi partners, you have been holding the areas you have cleared. By helping Iraqis reestablish basic services and local governance, you have helped exploit the security gains. And by partnering closely with Iraqi Security Forces, you have been strengthening Iraqi elements that will one day have sole responsibility for protecting their population. Indeed, while Iraqi forces clearly remain a work in progree, Iraqi soldiers and police are very much in the fight, and they continue to sustain losses that are two to three times our losses. We are also building momentum in an emerging area of considerable importance – local reconciliation. Local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. With growing Government of Iraq support, these volunteers are being integrated into legitimate institutions to help improve local security. While this concept is playing out differently in various areas across Iraq, it is grounded in a desire shared by increasing numbers of Iraqis – to oppose extremist elements and their ideologies. This is very significant, as many of you know first-hand, extremists cannot survive without the support of the population. The popular rejection of Al Qaeda and its ideology has, for example, helped transform Anbar Province this year from one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq to one of the safest. The popular rejection has helped Coalition and Iraqi Forces take away other areas from Al Qaeda as well, and we are seeing a spread of this sentiment in an ever-increasing number of Sunni areas. Now, in fact, we are also seeing a desire to reject extremists emerge in many Shi’a areas. The progress has not, to be sure, been uniform across Baghdad or across Iraq. Accomplishments in some areas – for example, in Ramadi and in Anbar Province – have been greater than any of us might have predicted six months ago. The achievements in some other areas – for example, in some particularly challenging Baghdad neighborhoods and in reducing overall civilian casualties, especially those caused by periodic, barbaric Al Qaeda bombings – have not been as dramatic. However, the overall trajectory has been encouraging, especially when compared to the situation at the height of the sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007. Many of us hoped this summer would be a time of tangible political progress at the national level as well. One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions and agree on key pieces of “national reconciliation” legislation. It has not worked out as we had hoped. All participants, Iraqi and coalition alike, are dissatisfied by the halting progress on major legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba’athification reform. At the same time, however, our appreciation of what this legislation represents for Iraqi leaders has grown. These laws are truly fundamental in nature and will help determine how Iraqis will share power and resources in the new Iraq. While much work remains to be done before these critical issues are resolved, the seriousness with which Iraqi leaders came together at their summit in late August has given hope that they are up to the task before them, even if it is clearly taking more time than we initially expected. In the coming months, our coalition’s countries and all Iraqis will continue to depend on each of you and on our Iraqi counterparts to keep the pressure on the extremists, to help security and strengthen the rule of law for all Iraqis, to work with the Government of Iraq to integrate volunteers into local security and national institutions, to assist with the restoration and improvement of basic services, and to continue the development of conditions that foster reconciliation. For our part, Ambassador Crocker and I will continue to do everything in our power to help the Prime Minister and the Government of Iraq achieve the meaningful results that will ensure that your sacrifices and those of your comrades help produce sustainable security for Iraq over the long term. A stable and secure Iraq that denies extremists a safe haven and has a government that is representative of and responsive to all Iraqis helps protect the vital interests of our coalition countries. A stable and secure Iraq will also benefit Iraq’s citizens and Iraq’s neighbors alike, bringing clam to a region full of challenges and employing iraq’s human capital and natural resource blessings for the benefit of all. As I noted at the outset of this letter, over the next few days, Ambassador Crocker and I will share with the U.S. Congress and the American people our assessment of the situation in Iraq. I will also describe the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command. I will go before Congress conscious of the strain on our forces, the sacrifices that you and your families are making, the gains we have made in Iraq, the challenges that remain, and the importance of building on what we and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve. Thanks once again for what each of you continue to do. Our Nations have asked much of you and your families.

It remains the greatest of honors to serve with you.


Sincerely, s/ David H. Petraeus General, United States Army Commanding -----

Marine Corps Reserve Sgt. Jeff Hunter--SILVER STAR

For his actions under fire from an ambush that seriously wounded the OIC--Marine Sgt. Jeff Hunter received the Silver Star

“I honestly don’t believe I did anything all that heroic,” Sgt. Jeff Hunter told Military.com when asked about his Silver Star. That’s a common refrain among American warriors serving in combat zones, but for those who served with Hunter during two intense fights, it’s a dramatic understatement.

Albuquerque, NM
Silver Star recipient

In the early hours of May 25, then-Cpl. Hunter set out on foot with Lima Company toward Haditha's market district in the opening days of Operation New Market.

According to Hunter, the company planned to arrive at the market by sunrise in order to catch insurgents by surprise. He said the trip seemed like any other, until a Marine shot a stray dog that had charged him. About ten seconds later, "all hell broke loose," Hunter said.

The award citation released by the Corps and interviews with Hunter and his fellow Marines reveal the platoon was ambushed by small arms fire that seriously wounded an officer on the patrol. Sgt. David Wimberg, Hunter's squad leader, ordered the squad to take a house to their left, where they were receiving fire.

Wimberg hopped the fence and opened the gate for Hunter's fire team, then kicked in the door and ran inside with Hunter on his heels.

"Sgt. Wimberg barely took a second step into the room before a muzzle to an AK-47 was presented [at his chest] and fired several times," Hunter said in a recap of the events he wrote after the firefight.

When Wimberg fell to the ground, "I instinctively reached down and grabbed him, pulling him back out of the house," Hunter wrote. "I dragged him to the right of the door under a window and lay on top of him while I heard him wheeze for us to frag the room."

Hunter called for two of his squad mates to take Wimberg to their corpsman while he pushed forward with the attack on the house.

"In the back of my mind, I knew that I was now in charge of the squad and I had to get control of the situation," he wrote.

"Acting as squad leader, [Hunter] reorganized his Marines and led them into the insurgent position…ultimately securing the house with close-range small arms fire and hand grenades," according to the Corps release. Wimberg later died as a result of his wounds, but Hunter's actions during the firefight "enabled his company to regain its momentum," the release said.

Two months later, Hunter found himself in another fierce gunfight, a battle that lasted for four hours and meandered through the streets of Cykla, a village near Haditha. After enemy fire from a hostile house hit a Marine, Hunter’s platoon engaged the enemies, forcing them to flee to a second home. By the time his squad cleared the second house, the insurgents had already left. Two of the Marines approached a couple of nearby cinder block buildings, and one of them was suddenly hit by insurgents firing from a fortified position. Hiding behind a three-foot-high wall, Hunter returned fire and shot two insurgents. He also made two attempts to extract the wounded Marine. The shooting was too intense, so Hunter ran through the line of fire and across the street to an M1A1 tank – which he guided to strike the enemies’ position. The tank eliminated the threat and allowed the platoon to retrieve its mortally wounded comrade.

For his actions, Sgt. Hunter received the Silver Star last June at his hometown of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Hunter is currently completing his education at the University of New Mexico.

• Military.com
• Albuquerque Tribune
• DOD Heroes
  

Case Against Haditha Marine Falls Apart

The so called damming evidence against the Haditha Marines is the word of two Orcs whose cell phone exchanges had initially tipped off our Marines to an impending ambush. Cell electronic signatures were compared and they matched the same two helpful Orcs who were the source for Time magazine ace reporter Tim McGirk reportage of a Marine "rampage" in Haditha.

IBD Editorial

As it turns out, the insurgents whose communications were intercepted, revealing the planned ambush, were the same two men who were the sources of the fallacious and dishonest March 27, 2006, Time magazine story that prompted the charges against the Haditha Marines.

Time magazine reporter Tim McGirk has written about how a "budding journalism student" had given him a video taken after the Marines' alleged rampage. Except the student was 43-year-old Taher Thabet al-Hadithi, head of a human rights organization whose only other member was Ali Omar Abrahem el-Mashhadani.

Final Photos of Marine Riverine DSU-3 Before Heading into the Archives

Navy Sailors from Riverine Squadron 1 (RIVRON-1) and Marines from Dam Security Unit 3 (DSU-3), aboard a small unit riverine boat during an operation in Taqaddum, Iraq, March 15, 2007.
The operation will show the ropes to RIVRON-1 in the area that DSU-3 has been covering for the past six months. RIVRON-1 will be looking for Vampire Ocs in Anbar province of Iraq now that the Navy has, in its infinite wisdom, decided to recreate the brown water Navy. DSU-3 will return to the states and be disbanded.







Here they are getting ready
to launch the small unit reconnaissance craft during an operation in Ramadi, Iraq, March 15, 2007.








U.S. Navy Chief Boatswain's Mate Steven Mancini, from Riverine Squadron 1 (RIVRON-1), and Gunny Jason N. Shiflet, from Dam Security Unit 3 (DSU-3), navigate their small unit riverine craft to Taqaddum, Iraq,







U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. B.J. Keller, with Dam Security Unit 3 (DSU-3), 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, scans the area while conducting an operation in Ramadi, Iraq, March 15, 2007











Senior Airmen Michael Wilhelm, with Riverine Squadron 1 (RIVRON-1), Detachment 3, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, scans the area aboard a small unit reconnaissance craft during an operation in Ramadi, Iraq, Ma rch 15, 2007.