From Defense and the National Interest
Three New Levels of War
While the classical three levels of war carry over into the Fourth Generation,
they are joined there by three new levels which may be more important.
Colonel Boyd identified these three new levels as the
physical, the mental and the moral.
Further, he argued that the physical level -- killing people and breaking things -- is the least powerful,
the moral level is the most powerful
and the mental level lies between the other two.
Colonel Boyd argued that this is especially true in guerilla warfare,
which is more closely related to Fourth Generation war than is formal warfare
between state militaries.
The history of guerilla warfare, from the Spanish guerilla war against Napoleon
through Israel's experience in southern Lebanon, supports Colonel Boyd's observation.
This leads to the central dilemma of Fourth Generation war:
what works for you on the physical (and sometimes mental) level often works against you at the moral level.
It is therefore very easy in a Fourth Generation conflict to win all the tactical engagements
yet lose the war.
To the degree you win at the physical level by pouring on firepower that causes casualties and property damage to the local population, every physical victory may move you closer to
moral defeat.
And the moral level is decisive.
Some examples from the American experience in Iraq help illustrate the contradiction between the
physical and moral levels:
• The U.S. Army conducted many raids on civilian homes in areas it occupied. In these raids, the
troops physically dominated the civilians. Mentally, they terrified them. But at the moral level,
breaking into private homes in the middle of the night, terrifying women and children and
sometimes treating detainees in ways that publicly humiliated them (like stepping on their heads)
worked powerfully against the Americans. An enraged population responded by providing the
Iraqi resistance with more support at every level of war, physical, mental and moral.
• At Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison, MPs and interrogators dominated prisoners physically and
mentally -- as too many photographs attest. But when that domination was publicly exposed, the
United States suffered an enormous defeat at the moral level. Some American commanders
recognized the power of the moral level when they referred to the soldiers responsible for the
abuse as, "the jerks who lost us the war."
• In Iraq and elsewhere, American troops (other than Special Forces) quickly establish base camps
that mirror American conditions: air conditioning, good medical care, plenty of food and pure
water, etc.
The local people are not allowed into the bases except in service roles.
Physically, the American superiority over the lives the locals lead is overwhelming. Mentally, it projects the power and success of American society.
But morally, the constant message of "we're better than you"
works against the Americans. (read Michael Yon "It's not about money-it's the mindset:We live far better on base here in Baqubah than many people who are living downtown (though there are some very nice homes), and it’s not all about money. Not at all and not in the least. When Americans move into Iraqi buildings, the buildings start improving from the first day. And then, the buildings near the buildings start to improve. It’s not about the money, but the mindset. The Greatest Generation called it “the can-do mentality.” It’s a wealth measured not only in dollars, but also in knowledge. The burning curiosity that launched the Hubble, flows from that mentality, and so does the revenue stream of taxpayer dollars that funded it. Iraq is very rich in resources, but philosophically it is impoverished. The truest separation between cultures is in the collective dreams of their people.)
Traditional cultures tend to put high values on pride and honor, and
when foreigners seem to sneer at local ways, the locals may respond by defending their honor in
a traditional manner -- by fighting.
In response to the American presence, Fourth Generation war
spreads rather than contracts.
The practice of a successful Fourth Generation entity, al Qaeda,
offers an interesting contrast.
Osama bin Laden, who comes from a wealthy family, lives in a cave.
In part, it is for security. But it also reflects a keen understanding of the power of the moral level of war.
By sharing the hardships and dangers of his followers, Osama bin Laden draws a sharp contrast at the
moral level with the leaders of local states, and also with senior officers in most state armies.
The contradiction between the physical and moral levels of war in Fourth Generation conflicts is
similar to the contradiction between the tactical and strategic levels, but the two are not identical. The
physical, mental and moral levels all play at each of the other levels -- tactical, operational and strategic.
Any disharmony among levels creates openings which Fourth Generation opponents will be quick to
exploit.
Of course, we can also exploit our opponents' disharmonies.
[AKA The Mixed Message]
For example, let us say that one of our opponents is a religious grouping. In a town where we have a presence, a local feud results in the killing of a clergyman by members of the same grouping.
In itself, this is a minor tactical event. But if we use our own information warfare to focus the public's attention on it, pointing out how the tenets of the religion are not being observed by those who claim to speak for it, we might create a “moral bomb.”
[Top Islamic leader condemns jihad killings]
[ see the UK GuardianIn a prison cell south of Cairo a repentant Egyptian terrorist leaderSayid Imam al-Sharif, 57 is putting the finishing touches to a remarkable recantation that undermines the Muslim theological basis for violent jihad and is set to generate furious controversy among former comrades still fighting with al-Qaida. Sayid Imam al-Sharif, 57, was the founder and first emir (commander) of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organisation, whose supporters assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and later teamed up with Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in the war against the Soviet occupation. Sharif, a surgeon who is still known by his underground name of "Dr Fadl", is famous as the author of the Salafi jihadists' "bible" - Foundations of Preparation for Holy War. He worked with Ayman al-Zawahiri, another Egyptian doctor and now Bin Laden's deputy, before being kidnapped in Yemen after 9/11, interrogated by the CIA and extradited to Egypt where has been serving a life sentence since 2004. Sharif recently gave an electrifying foretaste of his conversion by condemning killings on the basis of nationality and colour of skin and the targeting of women and children, citing the Qur'anic injunction: "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress the limits; for God loveth not transgressors." Armed operations were wrong, counterproductive and must cease, he declared sternly. "If you want to rob these people of their cover you have to take away their legitimacy," says Ashraf Mohsin, an Egyptian diplomat dealing with counter-terrorism.
"The way to deprive them of their ability to recruit is to attack the message. If you take Islam out of the message all that is left is criminality."]
A physical action would play on the moral level, just as a tactical action would play on a strategic level.
Here we see how the classical and new levels of war intersect.
